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Abstract
Malware brings significant threats to modern digitized society.
Malware developers put in significant efforts to evade detection and
remain unnoticed on victims’ computers despite a number of malware
detection techniques. To eliminate known and noticeable traces in
memory, network or disk activities, they use encryption and obfuscation.
Because of this, there remains a strong need for new malware detection
methods, especially ones based on Machine Learning models, because
processing of large amounts of data is not a suitable task for a
human. This paper presents a novel method that could potentially
detect zero-day attacks and contribute to proactive malware detection.
Our method is based on analysis of sequences of memory access
operations produced by binary file during execution. In order to perform
experiments, we utilized an automated virtualized environment with
binary instrumentation tools to trace the memory access sequences.
Unlike the other relevant papers, we focus only on analysis of basic (Read
and Write) memory access operations and their n-grams rather than on
the fact of a presence or an overall number of operations. Additionally,
we performed a study of n-grams of memory accesses and tested it against
real-world malware samples collected from open sources. Collected data
and proposed feature construction methods resulted in accuracy of up to
98.92% using such Machine Learning methods as k-NN and ANN. Thus,
we believe that our proposed method will serve as a stepping stone for
better proactive malware detection techniques in the future.
1 Introduction
Malware is the malicious software designed to perform an illegal or unwanted
activity on a victims system. The VirusShare database [1] contains 25,072,568
malware samples as of 9th May, 2016. When a new malware sample is detected
there is a time gap between the moment antivirus vendors can analyze it and the
moment they update their databases for their customers. To thwart detection,
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malware developers develop additional techniques to evade detection by antimalware
software through the use of different obfuscation techniques such as encryption,
polymorphism, metamorphism, dead code insertions, and instruction substitution [2]
in order to change the appearance of a file and its static characteristics. For example,
it is possible to change hash sums used as file signatures (such that SHA-1 or md5)
by simply changing different strings in the file. Further, dead code insertions can be
used in executables to change opcode sequences, making detection troublesome.
There are two main approaches for malware analysis that can be found in
the literature [3, 4]: static and dynamic. Static analysis is done on a malicious
file without its execution and aimed at collecting various static characteristics
such as bytes, opcodes and API n-grams frequencies, Portable Executable header
features, strings and others [2, 5, 6]. Dynamic analysis is based on running a
malicious executable in a controlled environment and tracking its activity within
the system. Such activities include network, registry and disk usage patterns, API-
calls monitoring, instruction tracing, memory layout investigation and others [7].
To collect such information one can use either specialized sandboxes like Cuckoo [8]
or utilize any Virtual Machines such as VirtualBox accompanied by a debugger or
other watchdog software. Despite the fact that some authors consider [9, 10] disk
and network activities crucial for malware detection, few authors have outlined the
utility of memory properties analysis [11, 12].
This paper presents a novel methodology for malware detection. It is based on
the extraction of the memory access sequences (further called memtraces) for both
benign and malicious executables using the dynamic binary instrumentation tool
Intel Pin [13]. This dynamic binary instrumentation tool is used for live analysis
of binary executables and allows for analyzing different properties of execution such
as memory activity, opcodes, addressing space, etc. Our proposed methodology is
based on the assumption that similar opcodes with similar arguments will result
in nearly the same memtraces, which is explained later in the paper. Thus, we
apply an n-gram technique to extract features from memtrace sequences in order to
perform benign against malicious classification. Moreover, we used specially-tuned
feature selection to be able to verify classification accuracy while adhering to a set
of community-accepted Machine Learning (ML) methods. It will be shown that our
method can find an application in proactive malware analysis with reliable results
using only fraction of the execution records of the malware sample. Unlike the other
related works, where authors worked on specific ML methods and other dynamic
features, we focus primarily on memory access sequences and patterns within them.
So, this paper contributes to a new malware detection methodology and test it
against real-world samples.
The remainder of the paper is organized as following: 2 presents an overview
of the dynamic malware analysis, including existing behavioural characteristics as
well as how memory activity can be used for identification of malicious activities.
Further, 3 presents our contribution towards the memtraces analysis for malware
detection. Description of the collected malware samples and analysis of the results
are given in the 4 section. Finally, 5 contains our final remarks and conclusion.
2 Memory patterns in malware detection
In this section we provide a short overview of existent studies that are related to ours,
because there dynamic binary instrumentation tools and memory activity analysis
were also used.
Dynamic malware analysis involves malware execution in the controlled
environment with further investigation of its activity and any possible traces that
can be found in the system. In the Malware Analysis Cookbook, Ligh et al. [14]
defined the following automated procedure for dynamic malware analysis covering
a set of predefined operations ranging from VM start up to traces collection.
According to SANS [3] one may conclude that a number of behavioural
characteristics can be used to identify whether or not an executable file has some
malicious functionality. With a use of such dynamic malware analysis, it is
possible to collect different types of features such as file system events, registry
changes, API and DLL calls, network and memory activity [9]. In the paper [10],
the authors claim that memory analysis without ground-truth cant be considered
trustworthy, especially on proprietary operating systems (e.g. MS Windows).
They investigate the accuracy and efficiency of traversal-based and signature-
based memory analysis tools (Volatility [15] framework and its plug-ins), which
are designed to gather information about processes, modules, files etc. Further
work [10] also examined accuracy and efficiency of robust field- and graph- based
signature schemes SigField [16] and SigGraph [17]. They compared results from
binary analysis tool and Volatility over the Virtual Machine memory, claiming that
traversal-based and signature-based methods tend to produce less accurate results.
A methodology for malware analysis with using Intel Pin was discussed
earlier [11]. The model was first tested in a virtual environment and afterwards
in a real environment with Windows XP or Xen Linux installed. They extracted
the following characteristics: system or user API calls if any file or folder was
modified, calls that create hard or symbolic links, calls or arguments of function
exec() and instructions that performed memory operations read and write. Unlike
in this paper, where we focus on single memory access operations generated by
single opcodes, they utilized basic blocks of a program. The basic block is an
instruction sequence which is executed between control flow transfer instructions.
Among other features, the authors used the fact of presence, size of transferred data
and memory range of memory access operations within the basic blocks. Recording
the execution trace they generated regular expressions and security policies, which
then were used for malware detection. As the result, they achieved 100% detection
rate for original and obfuscated malware samples on both Windows and Linux.
The authors claim that their system is capable of accurate malware detection
with 93.68% code and path coverage of input-dependent executables. Finally, it
is worth mentioning the work [12] that proposed the ensemble learning technique
of malware detection based on a number of features extracted with Intel Pin [13]:
frequency of opcode occurrence, presence of particular opcode, difference between
frequency of opcode in malware and benign executables, distance and presence
memory reference and total number of load and store memory operations as well
as branches. For each executable they collected a feature vector for every 10,000
committed instructions and achieved classification accuracy up to 95.9% with a
specialized ensemble classifier.
3 Memtraces for malware detection
The proposed method based on memtraces is described below. Steps from
characteristics collection and feature construction for future use in ML are presented.
Collecting memory access
Opcode (API calls) n-grams have consistently been successfully utilized as reliable
features for malware detection [18]. No matter the programming language or
frameworks used for developed programs, a compiled PE32 executable can be
represented as a sequence of opcode instructions. Opcodes (or assembly commands)
are basic commands executed on the hardware level. Some operate only with
CPU’s registers, and as such XOR EAX,EAX or MOV ESI,EBX wont have any
interaction with virtual memory, while others can generate sequences reading from
and writing to virtual memory operations, for instance MOV EBX, V AR NAME
which reads from memory and MOV [V AR NAME], 110 which writes to it.
In this paper we analyse sequences of basic memory access operations which are
R for Read and W for Write operations. Our goal is to record a sequence of memory
access operations, or memtraces, and analyze this sequence. The majority of modern
desktop computers utilize x86 compatible architectures that were introduced in order
to implement pipelines and, as a result, increase execution speed. Modern x86
compatible CPUs translate opcodes into a sequence of micro-operations (or uops)
responsible for loading and storing data, interacting with arithmetic logical units,
branching, and so on, each uop executed on the specific port. Some authors collected
information about number and types of micro-operations used by CPUs in order to
execute certain opcodes, as in [19] where such information was collected for Intel
architectures ranging from Pentium to the Skylake architecture. For example, in
Sandy Bridge architecture port p23 stands for memory read or address calculation,
and p4 for memory write.
To be more specific, we focus on opcodes that allow interaction with memory
such as MOV, AND, XOR, ADD etc. It was found that, regarding the number of
load and store micro-operations, the opcodes were similar to those presented in the
book [19]. Our scope was confined to solely memory-related activity, and we looked
for a number of micro-operations going to a memory read port (e.g. p2 or p3 for Ivy
Bridge and Skylake architectures) or a memory write port (e.g. p4 for Ivy Bridge
and Skylake architectures). No similar information was found for AMD CPUs, so
the scope was also limited to Intel processors. With the help of Intel Pin, we checked
data that are usually transferred by the detected read and write operations where
we found that most of the memory operations involve transfers of 4 bytes. (1- 2- 8-
and 10-byte memory accesses were also found.) This means that Intel Pin is capable
of detecting memory operations on the level of separate opcodes and has the desired
granularity. From the results of this study we concluded that opcode with similar
parameters will generate similar memory access sequence regardless of the overall
task of the executable and Intel CPU model. To verify this we tried, with help of
Intel Pin, to make the output contain executed opcodes and its (if exists) memory
operations. The examples of opcodes and memtraces captured from calc.exe benign
executable taken from Windows 7 are given below.
[mov edi, dword ptr [ebp -0x20]]
R
[add dword ptr [eax], ecx]
RW
[mov dword ptr [ebp -0x8], edx]
W
This sequence can be explained as following:
• mov edi, dword ptr [ebp-0x20] reads from memory, and writes this information
to the edi register. According to [19] instructions of type MOV Register,
Memory for all addressing types involves 1 read operation (1 microoperation
for the port p23).
• add dword ptr [eax], ecx reads data from address that is previously
calculated (by the memory read port which has additional function of address
calculation), then it calculates the sum and later data is written to the already
calculated address. Instructions of type ADD Memory, Register involves 2
microoperations to the store port (one for address calculation and one for
reading) and 1 microoperation for writing [19].
• Instruction mov dword ptr [ebp-0x8], edx generates W (Write) because MOV
Memory, Register is a memory writing.
Based on what was said above, we highlight two hypotheses: (i) Opcode n-grams
are reliable features for malware detection as described earlier, and (ii) Opcodes with
similar arguments will produce similar memory activity. As results, memtraces can
be used as robust features for identification of malware samples. It is hard to say
how many memtraces are required for good detection rate; this will have to be
studied later on. To start with, however, we decided to restrict length of recorded
memtrace sequence to 10 millions of records. According to our measurements, in
order to perform 10,000,000 memtraces, an executable (from our dataset) spends
about 0.053 seconds on our hardware. Time was recorded with a use of chrono a
C++ library. This makes our system potentially applicable for the systems which
require near real time malware detection because classification of a software sample
will take less than a second. Afterwards, the original memtrace sequence is pruned
to get first 100,000 and then 1,000,000 memtraces in order to study influence of the
memtraces sequence length on the accuracy.
N-gram as feature extraction
In order to detect malicious executable we record the sequence of memory access
operations(memtraces). We define original memtrace sequence Soriginal as a set
of memory access operations: Soriginal = (m1,m2, ...ml) where l is the number of
memtraces recorded during execution of a program and mi is either Read or Write
memory access operation. Memtrace sequence ms is defined as subgroup of original
memtrace sequence where ms ⊆ Soriginal. Here ms is constructed from memtraces:
ms = (mk+0,mk+1...mk+p−1) where k ∈ [1, l − p + 1] is the starting position of
certain memtrace sequence, and p ∈ [1, l] is the length of memtrace sequence. So,
the memtrace sequence of length p=n is called n-gram. We use only R for read and
W for write operation regardless to size of the transmitted data. Then we extract
n-grams of preferred size from the original memtrace sequence. While authors who
apply opcode n-grams for virus detection usually use n=1, n=2 [20] n=3, n=4, n=5
[21], we could not use n of such small sizes. Here are the reasons:
• Executable may contain hundreds of different opcodes. Thus, sequences of
OR,OR,OR and ADD,ADD,ADD represent different features for opcode based
methods.
• We trace only memory accesses. Thus, both OR,OR,OR and ADD,ADD,ADD
(Memory, Register operands) can be recorded as RWRWRW and RWRWRW.
• Memtraces sequence is a binary sequence, because it contains only two
symbols. For the length of 1 or 10 million, class-wise frequency for memtrace
n-gram of size 6 will be close to uniform, and there is a high likelihood, that
among benign and malicious classes there will be no a single unique n-gram
for particular class.
During initial experiments, we also found that there is no class-unique n-grams
up to the size of 12 for the dataset used for experiment. It can be explained by the
fact that not all the opcodes generate memtrace activity. From one perspective it
makes less data to work with, but from another, it could probably result in lower
classification accuracy. So, we decided to start from n-gram size of 16, and proceed
with 20,24,36,48,72,96 to cover different n-grams and have feasible processing and
analysis overhead. Another reason of increasing n-gram size is that probability of
particular n-gram to occur in a sequence of memtraces is higher for smaller n values,
thus utilizing small n values can result in impossibility of finding unique features
and low classification accuracy. We limit n-gram size to 96 because our scripts were
not able to finish bitmap construction for 10,000,000 memtraces due to low memory
error.
Feature Selection
To use extracted memtraces for training ML models, we need to extract features that
will provide the best description of classes [22]. A perfect feature for classification
task is the feature, that exists only in particular class and is present in all instances of
this class. However, in real-world problems, it is usually very hard or even impossible
to find such features. So, the task is to find features that fit previously stated request
better than others using the following steps:
1. For each class (benign and malicious) construct vector of n-grams
(which are unique within the class) and their class-wise frequencies, e.g.:
[[WWR, 1.0], [WRW, 0.87], [RRR, 0.66], ...]
2. Having two vectors, one for benign and one for malicious executables, we delete
those n-grams that are present in both vectors, regardless to their class-wise
frequencies. In other words, we subtract intersection of two sets from each of
them and get two clean vectors.
3. From each of clean vectors we select a particular amount (e.g. 100,200,400)
of n-grams with highest class-wise frequency and combine them into the final
feature vector of length 200, 400 or 800. The numbers 100, 200, 400 were
chosen, because many researchers used to utilize feature numbers from 100 to
1,000. So, this a common baseline for similar researches, yet we need to take
into account ML software performance.
However, to be able to apply ML classification we need to build a bitmap (matrix)
of presence, where ”1” is placed if particular instance contains particular feature
and ”0” if not. Such bitmap is used later to train ML methods. In order to assess
model quality, we will use 5-fold cross validation. For results assessment, we will
use classification accuracy because it shows how well model performs on the whole
dataset. Finally, newly built feature vector is then used for building the bitmap that
is later used in Machine Learning algorithms.
4 Experiments & Results
This section is devoted to experiments design and analysis of achieved results of the
proposed method.
Computing Environment
All our experiments were performed on Virtual Dedicated Server (VDS) with
Intel(R) Core(TM) CPU @ 3.60GHz, 4 cores, SSD RAID and 48GB RAM. Ubuntu
14.04 64 was installed with MySQL 5.5, PHP 5.5.9 and VirtualBox 5.0.16. Windows
7 32-bit was used as guest OS, because of its wide spread [23] and the fact that
malware written for 32-bit OS’s will run on 64-bit as well. Another reason to use
32-bit version of Windows 7 is that our VDS was not capable of running newer or
64-bit versions of Windows due to virtualization issues.
Malware & data collection
Benign files were collected from clean installations of 32 bit versions of Microsoft
Windows OS (XP, 7, 8, 10). The reason of such choice is that there is no publicly
available datasets with big amount of benign files. Malicious files were taken from
VirusShare repository [1] (VirusShare 00207.zip). This archive contains collection
of PE32 files, which is a very popular executable format due to strong legacy of
32-bit operational systems and compatibility issues. Both benign and malicious files
were unsorted and uncategorised. In order to avoid duplicates, files were renamed
with their md5 sums. Having information gained from peframe [24] those files, that
contain GUI field in the peframe output, were selected. The reason of this kind
of filtering is that many malicious executables, that don’t have GUI, can switch
to idle mode soon after start, so, this will bring significant problems to automated
dynamic analysis since it could produce very small amounts of data or it will require
an unreasonably long waiting time. After files were filtered by presence of GUI, the
smallest 1,000 files from each of the datasets were selected. File sizes of selected
benign and malicious executables vary from 115.4 KB to 152.1 KB and from 976
bytes to 28.7 KB respectively. The experiments setup included automated execution
of malware as specified in the Figure 1 according to [14].
Create Virtual Machine 
with Windows 7 installed
Copy Intel Pin tool to VM
Copy malware and benign 
samples to VM
Restore snapshot
Shut down VM
Create snapshot
Run next 
executable sample 
under Pin tool
Read file with 
memtraces from 
VM
Store memtraces 
to the database
Suspend VM
Pin tool records 
memtraces produced by 
an executable and 
stores it to file
Figure 1: Automated malware analysis using Intel Pin for metraces sequences
extraction
During the experiments only 445 benign and 759 malicious files managed to start
since some had anti-debug or anti-VM features. Final dataset contains 1,204 files
and MySQL table with raw memtraces occupies 6.9 GB of storage space and table
of 96-grams for memtrace sequence length of 10,000,000 takes 32.2 GB.
Results
We used memory access sequence of lengths 100,000; 1,000,000 and 10,000,000, n-
gram sizes of 16,20,24,36,48,72,96 and feature set sizes of 200,400, and 800. The
following ML methods were trained: NB (Naive Bayes), BN (Bayesian Network),
J48 (C4.5), k-NN (k-Nearest Neighbours), ANN (Artificial Neural Network) and
SVM (Support Vector Machine). In this paper we present only the most outstanding
achieved results.
Influence of the memtrace sequence length and n-gram on classification accuracy
Considering three lengths mentioned before, we can say, that usage of the first
1,000,000 memtraces is enough to achieve good malware detection rate together
with the number of selected features equal to 800. The results of experiments are
given in the Table 1. Other configurations gave lower or equal results.
n-gram size
Machine Learning method
NB BN J48 k-NN ANN SVM
100,000 memtraces
16 60.22 60.47 64.29 64.20 63.54 63.54
20 60.88 62.71 65.03 65.61 63.54 63.54
24 62.46 63.95 67.19 67.28 62.13 63.54
36 59.72 60.63 67.61 67.77 62.54 63.62
48 59.72 59.72 68.77 68.94 62.96 64.45
72 64.12 64.12 71.26 71.26 64.70 67.28
96 67.03 67.03 70.76 71.01 63.87 68.77
1,000,000 memtraces
16 60.71 61.30 82.97 83.80 83.80 70.02
20 55.32 55.32 83.89 84.88 61.38 77.74
24 56.15 56.81 79.49 79.57 61.38 76.50
36 57.64 57.64 78.16 78.32 65.70 76.16
48 73.34 73.34 85.71 85.88 65.86 85.05
72 92.11 92.11 90.95 91.20 92.03 92.03
96 94.44 94.44 98.84 98.92 98.92 98.51
Table 1: Accuracy %, for 800 features
We can see that k-NN and ANN provide best classification accuracy of 98.92%
for 1,000,000 memtraces, 800 features and 96-grams. k-NN also shows most of
the row-wise best results in the tables. However, the point where k-NN and ANN
reached best accuracy could not be stated as optimal condition for malware-benign
classification task. Several results were not gained due to out-of-memory problem,
but better results could probably be achieved in future work. From one point of view
k-NN is a good algorithm, because it doesn’t require actual training phase. However,
it makes no generalization about processed data. This can result in overfitting and
classification time growth. Among others, J48 and ANN showed good results and
could be considered as reliable candidates for malware-benign classification task if
k-NN is not suitable for some reason. As we can see from the Table 1, the more
memtraces we have in the original sequence - the higher accuracy we gain. This
is natural dependency because bigger length of memtrace sequence gives us more
information about an executable. As we can see, n-grams (48, 72, 96) of bigger
size gives us better accuracy. Finally, we have also studied influence of the number
of features on classification accuracy. Similarly to memory access sequence length,
overall dependency shows growth of accuracy with growth of feature number as
shown in the Figure 2.
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Figure 2: Accuracy depending on n-gram size and number of features (200-800) for
all memtrace sequences lengths
Analysis of the classification accuracy
The non-trivial factors that influence classification accuracy are given in the Table 2
first. During the feature selection process we used to calculate intersection of unique
n-grams sets from benign and malicious executables. This intersection then was
subtracted from both benign and malicious unique n-gram sets. From the Table
we can see that characteristics of intersection under different memtrace sequence
lengths and n-gram sizes. It contains the following columns: n-gram size - the
size of n-gram, Isec - the number of unique n-grams shared between benign and
malicious executables (intersection size), B unique - the number of unique n-grams
found in benign executables, M unique - the number of unique n-grams found in
malicious executables, Ratio - intersection ratio, shows similarity between malicious
and benign n-grams sets. Calculated as Ratio = Isec
(B unique+M unique)
The Table 2
contain intersection ratios calculated for the 1,000,000 memtraces.
n-gram size isec B unique M unique Ratio
16 50,751 53,587 56,722 0.46008
20 156,553 209,037 240,098 0.34857
24 234,725 364,926 440,593 0.29140
36 372,336 670,314 1,009,935 0.22160
48 481,347 910,659 1,655,659 0.18756
72 694,570 1,384,718 2,944,111 0.16045
96 918,076 1,884,036 4,201,454 0.15086
Table 2: Intersection size and ratio for unique benign and malicious n-grams for
1,000,000 memtraces
Interpretation of achieved results and findings
In the Figure 3 we show dependency between accuracy rate and intersection ratio
for 1M of memtraces and all lengths of feature vector. Accuracy rates were taken
from k-NN column of corresponding result table because k-NN has shown most of
the best results for particular n-gram size. Logarithmic trendlines were added to
every series for easier understanding. We will use k-NN’s accuracy to illustrate other
findings and tendencies for the same reason.
The results achieved by k-NN under all conditions are shown in the Figure 2:
x-axis is for feature set, y-axis is for n-gram size and z-axis is for accuracy. Labels
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Figure 3: Accuracy vs intersection ratio for 106 memtraces
on x-axis are named as XXX type where XXX stands for feature number and type
for memtrace sequence length: h for 100,000, m for 1,000,000 and f for 10,000,000.
It is easy to see that growth of feature vector and memtrace sequence length (x-axis)
generally results in accuracy growth. Increase of N-gram size and feature number
result in accuracy growth, but now it is easier to see that area around n-gram size
of 24 contains descending of accuracy (as well as weak matrix sparseness fading and
area under class-wise frequency chart growth).
Worth to mention that there is visible correlation between intersection ratio and
accuracy rate. The smaller ratio implies the bigger accuracy. This can be explained
in the following way. Bigger intersection ratio means fewer features for feature
selection. This results in smaller class-wise frequency of a particular feature, hence
bigger sparseness of presence matrix. Sparse matrix can worsen generalization of
dataset and even result in zero-filled rows, which definitely will decrease accuracy. As
we utilize bitmap of presence, and our feature selection method is aimed at selecting
only class-unique features, zero-filled row means that particular sample could be
difficult to correspond to one of the classes. High matrix sparseness means that many
features are not very efficient. So, it will lower ability of ML methods to generalize
through the data. We conducted the study of class-wise frequencies of features
selected in feature vectors and found that there are no n-grams with frequency 1.0.
This means that either there does not exist a single n-gram that describes just
malicious or just benign executables or n-grams with class-wise frequency 1.0 were
rejected during feature selection as those present in both classes.
In the Figures 4, a and b Areas Under Feature Class-wise frequency charts
(AUFC) are visualized for both malicious and benign executables. Having charts
of this kind built, we can claim that there is a positive correlation between n-gram
size and area. Another natural finding is that the more features we have - the more
samples we can cover with them, this brings us better accuracy. Also, we found, that
AUFC for memtrace sequence length of 100,000 keeps growing on the n-gram size
from 24 to 48, while for other lengths growth is almost stopped. We should notice
that AUFC for malicious features is bigger than similar areas for benign features.
This means that benign files are more different from each other in terms of n-grams
than malicious ones. It can be explained as benign executables were made for bigger
variety of purposes, while malicious are aimed at performing malicious activity.
From one point of view AUFC is a good measure for estimation of feature
selection efficiency, but since ML algorithms work with presence bitmap, it is better
to use another measure, which will directly show quality of extracted data. As it was
said earlier, presence bitmap is a matrix of zeros and ones, so, if it has many zeros
it will be hard to generalize data, hence ML algorithms will produce lower accuracy.
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Figure 4: Area under class-wise frequency chart for 200 features
Let’s use sparseness as a measure of zeros percentage in matrix. Sparseness is a
ratio between numbers of zeros in matrix to number of cells and could be expressed
as sparseness = number of zeros
width of matrix · length of matrix .
Moreover, we also performed sparseness calculations for all bitmaps. Using sum
of benign and malicious AUFC and sparseness measures for all bitmaps, we built
charts in Figure 5 for 800 features. As it can be seen from this chart, sparseness of
presence bitmap is descending, while overall AUFC grows, proving earlier statement.
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Figure 5: Area under class-wise frequency chart for 800 features
5 Discussions & Conclusion
This work targets malware detection using memory access patterns based on
a sequence of read and write operations, also called memtraces. From the
literature, we can see that many authors target dynamic malware analysis due to
comprehensiveness of the collected behavioural features, including and not limited
to disk, network and memory patterns. Yet, only a few consider memory access
operations as reliable sources for malicious activities identifiers. We believe that
memtraces can be highly relevant for proactive malware analysis. This is because it
is the result of opcode execution, which produces consistent operations, yet may
slightly vary for different arguments. We proposed a method for fast malware
identification according to a presence or non-presence of a specific read and write
pattern in its memory access sequence. For our experiments we used 105, . . . , 107
memtraces and 200-800 features extracted using 12, . . . , 96 n-gram size. It was
found that 106 memtraces with 800 features and 96-grams give a robust classification
accuracy up to 98.92% using ML methods. In addition to this, we studied a range of
aspects and found that such method reveals a set of useful statistical properties that
can be further applied for threat identification and ML-based malware detection. We
believe that our work will contribute to proactive malware analysis in future.
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